Restaking

Restaking as an economic security and insurance

Standard security practices—such as assigning unique deposit addresses to users, requiring sufficient block confirmations to prevent double spending, and implementing nonce protection against replay attacks—are necessary but insufficient to defend against certain fundamental risks inherent in federation-based bridges. These vulnerabilities stem from the trust model of a multisignature federation, where control is distributed among a limited set of authorized operators. In such systems, coordinated collusion or misbehavior by a subset of signers can threaten the integrity of user funds.

To address these systemic risks, Stroom integrates a restaking protocol that economically binds operator behavior to verifiable outcomes. Rather than relying solely on a native governance token to enforce honest participation, restaking introduces high-value, deeply liquid assets—such as ETH, stablecoins, and liquid staking tokens (LSTs) like Lido’s stETH or eUSD—as operator collateral. These assets serve as slashing collateral, enabling punitive measures against malicious or negligent operators by imposing real financial penalties. The use of restaking enhances security guarantees and aligns operator incentives with the safety of the protocol.

Moreover, restaking frameworks support capital efficiency, allowing collateral to simultaneously secure multiple networks while maintaining meaningful economic weight. This enables Stroom to secure its bridge with a robust economic deterrent without excessive overcollateralization.

To appropriately compensate restakers for assuming slashing risk, Stroom allocates a portion of protocol revenue to them. The Stroom DAO governs this distribution, optimizing the balance between rewards for bridge users and incentives for restakers—ensuring a sustainable, risk-adjusted security model that reinforces trust in the system.